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This paper adapts a nonstochastic overlapping generations model to include liquidity constraints 
and intergenerational altruism. Existing work indicates the importance of both but often 
considers them separately. This paper studies their interactions. First, it shows that they tend to 
conflict - the model only admits stationary equilibria with dynastic wealth accumulation but no 
binding liquidity constraints, or with binding constraints but no dynastic accumulation. Second, it 
examines the latter type of equilibrium closely. If liquidity constraints bind, quantitative 
examples imply that consequent utility losses may be small and that economywide wealth 
accumulation tends to be unrealistically low. 
1. Introduction 
This paper is about two possible additions to a conventional overlapping 
generations model: lifetime liquidity constraints and intergenerational altru- 
ism. For the former, suppose bankruptcy laws lead creditors to demand 
tangible collateral for all loans. 1 Then households will have to maintain 
nonnegative asset positions at all times and will be able to follow separate 
consumption and earnings paths only over the period until a liquidity 
constraint next binds. There are many potential consequences: Dolde (1978) 
and Mariger (1986) show that lifetime constraints might significantly increase 
the response of aggregate consumption to a temporary tax change; Hubbard 
and Judd (1986, 1987) show that constraints can increase the disutility of 
social security taxes and reduce their impact on saving; and, Becker (1980), 
* I owe special thanks to the referees of this journal for many helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper. 
1This paper takes this legal system as given. The general approach contrasts to, for example, 
Yotsuzuka (1987). 
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Loury (1981), and others trace the effects of borrowing constraints on 
investments in human capital and the distribution of income. Empirical 
studies often raise the suspicion that liquidity constraints influence the 
behavior of a noticeable segment of the population - e.g., Hall and Mishkin 
(1982), Hayashi (1985), Mariger (1987), Zeldes (1989), Jappelli (1990), and 
Campbell and Mankiw (1990). There seems to be evidence of significant 
intergenerational transfers as well - see Kotlikoff and Summers (1981), Kurz 
(1984), Cox (1987), and Gale and Scholz (1991). Modifying a life-cycle 
framework to model them may influence its implications rather dramatically: 
intergenerational linkages via transfers can lead to Ricardian neutrality, with 
notable consequences for the analysis of social security and national debt [see 
Barro (1974)]; the locus of private sector desired stationary-state wealth 
holdings may become perfectly interest-elastic at the 'modified golden rule' 
level [see Blanchard and Fischer (1989, ch. 2) and fig. 1 below]; and intergen- 
erational connections conceivably mitigate the burdens of lifetime liquidity 
constraints [see, for instance, Hall (1986)]. Also, while the overlapping 
generations model has difficulty explaining observed quantities of wealth [see 
Kotlikoff and Summers (1981) and Kotlikoff (1988)], bequest-related savings 
might make up the shortfall. 
This paper has two purposes. Presuming altruism and liquidity constraints 
are both realistic, it first attempts to show that we should study them jointly. 
Existing work has done this to an e x t e n t -  showing, for example, that 
liquidity constraints on children may induce larger transfers from their 
parents than otherwise [see Altig and Davis (1989, sect. 4)]. This paper 
emphasizes the opposing nature of the two: altruism tends to lengthen time 
horizons for utility maximization; liquidity constraints do the reverse. Section 
2 shows that the set of possible steady-state equilibria for our model fully 
mirrors the conflict: long-term equilibria exist in which liquidity constraints 
never bind or in which constraints bind regularly within every line of descent, 
but no equilibria simultaneously include binding liquidity constraints and 
long-horizon 'operational '  connections within family lines. If a system is to 
explain both dynastic behavior and binding borrowing constraints, it would 
seem to require a degree of heterogeneity among consumers beyond differing 
birth dates. 
Second, this paper analyzes in detail the steady states above with binding 
constraints. ' Interior solution' equilibria have attracted a great deal of 
a t t e n t i o n -  see Barro (1974) and the representative agent formulations in 
Blanchard and Fischer (1989). Cases with binding constraints tend to receive 
less notice in the theoretical literature, however. Yet, they have quite 
different characteristics. Section 3 calls attention to some of the differences 
and to both similarities and contrasts to overlapping generations models with 
no altruism. Section 4 considers the quantitative properties of equilibria with 
binding constraints. One finding is that implied wealth accumulations are 
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disappointingly low - with, somewhat surprisingly, altruism partly to blame. 
A second is that utility losses from binding liquidity constraints tend to be 
smaller than specifications without altruism might lead one to suspect. 
Intergenerational transfers in this paper stem exclusively from altruism. 
While parents could derive pleasure from the size of their bequest alone, the 
framework here assumes they care about their descendants' consumption 
possibilities. This paper's specification of preferences makes altruism two- 
sided: parents and their adult children overlap in life for a number of 
periods; during the overlap, children are concerned about their parents, as 
well as parents about their children. The degree of altruism is strong: each 
household in a line of descent cares about its ancestors and descendants as 
much as itself. This is virtually opposite to the overlapping generations 
m o d e l -  in which parents abruptly stop caring about their childrens' con- 
sumption as the latter become adults. It does seem to have some intuitive 
appeal, and it yields key simplifications to the analysis below. 
2. The household sector 
As stated, this paper's model combines elements from life-cycle and 
representative agent frameworks. In terms of the former, an equal and large 
number of families of each age s ~ [0, 2.  T] comprise the economy. For the 
latter, each household cares about the consumption possibilities of its de- 
scendants and ancestors in addition to its own. This paper focuses exclusively 
on stationary-state growth. In such equilibria, which section 3 discusses in 
more detail, the net-of-tax interest rate, r, and next-of-tax wage per 'effec- 
tive' labor unit, w, are constant. 
Begin with the life-cycle part of the framework. The model has only one 
consumption good; its price is 1 at all dates. There are borrowing constraints 
ruling out negative net worth. Individual families live 2.  T years. Time is 
continuous. Adult children and their parents overlap in life for T years. In 
section 5, for instance, a family begins with a 20-year-old male and female; 
two children are born after five years; the parents are 45 when the children 
leave home to form their own families; and, the parents can live an additional 
26 y e a r s -  dying as their children's children become adults and form new 
families. There is no population growth. 
A household with consumption c(s) at age s ~ [0, 2.  T] derives a corre- 
sponding utility flow u(c(s), s). All families have the same function u(-). 
Assume 
o r  
u ( c ,  s )  = h ( s )  . ( 1 / 1 3 )  . ~ O , t ~ < l ,  
u(c, s) = h( s) - In (c ) ,  (1) 
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where h( . )  is exogenously given, piecewise twice continuously differentiable, 
and strictly positive. Section 5 uses h( . )  to register life-cycle variations in 
family composition. The elasticity of marginal substitution for consumption 
between time periods is 
(~ -  1 / (1  - / 3 ) .  
For the sake of simplicity, omit the separate logarithmic case below. 
A household's utility from its own lifetime consumption combines flows for 
ages 0 to 2 .  T. Let 6 > 0 be the subjective discount rate and 
A = e - 5 T .  
Then letting U 1 and U z be the first and second half of lifetime utility for the 
household above, 





Notice that U 1 + A • U 2 is only part of the household's total  utility - the 
contribution related to descendants and predecessors is incorporated below. 
A household of age s inelastically supplies l ( s )  natural labor units. If the 
time is t, technological change yields 
e r t  " l (  s ) ,  7 > O, 
'effective' labor units. Earnings abilities are identical among families of the 
same age and cohort. Assume that l ( . )  is piecewise continuously differen- 
tiable and that for some interval of ages [0, g], l ( s )  > O. 
Turning to altruism, for simplicity think of a patrilineal (or, alternatively, 
parthenogenetic) system: in their first T years parents raise a boy and a girl; 
in the following T years the children are adults and only the boy's household 
remains a concern to his parents - conversely, only the boy feels continuing 
responsibility for the parents. Laitner (1991) uses a noncooperative game- 
theoretic model to show that symmetric concern for offspring coupled with 
nonrandom mating can lead to the same type of analytical framework. 
Consider a single family (tracing descent patrilineally). Let the utility of the 
line's ith generation from its own lifetime consumption be U li -~ d . U 2i. The 
consumption is ci (s ) ,  s ~ [0, 2.  T]. Let the same household's total utility, 
including the portion which it derives from the consumption of its descen- 
J. Laitner, Equilibria with borrowing constraints and altruism 69 




wi=~ E AO- i ) .  [U2J + v l , j + l ] .  (3) 
j =  --oo 
i ~ =  { { c k ( s ) , s  ~ [0 ,  2" T]}_~< k <i,  {c i ( s ) , s  ~ [0, T]}} 
~/= {{ci(s),s ~ [T, 2" T]}, { c k ( s ) , s  ~ [0, 2- T]}i<~<~}, 
W i =  wi(i~ <). T h e  consumption path (;~, ~/) is feasible if it satisfies all 
budget and liquidity constraints spelled out below. If at date t the generation 
i family is age T, S '  is already past - hence fixed. This paper assumes that at 
date t in that event the family line's household of generation i wants a 
feasible ~/with 
W (ic,<.) . . , i t . . . . - . ,  
- w (i c, c i ) > O, all feasible ~/*. (4) 
This paper also assumes that the family line's generation i + 1 household at 
the same time wants a feasible ~ with 
wi+ 1(i~,, ~/) _ wi+ I[.~V ' ~//* ) -- > 0, all feasible ~//*. (5) 
Notice that since (4)-(5) are presented in terms of 'overtaking' criteria, their 
individual W i and W i+ 1 components need not be bounded. In fact, at time t 
utility flows for ~ '  are irrelevant in this formulation. 
Lines (4)-(5) incorporate two-sided altruism of the high degree outlined in 
the introduction: in each, U 2j and U l ' j+l  receive the same weight; thus, a 
young family in generation i + 1 cares about the concurrent consumption of 
its parents as if the latter consumption were its own, and the parents care 
about the consumption of their adult (male) child as if it were their own. 
Also, households apply the same subjective discount rate to all future utility 
flows within their line of descent as to their lifetime u(c~(s),  s). 
The geometric nature of subjective discounting in the definition of W / 
avoids the time consistency problems discussed by Strotz (1956). Since adult 
children and their parents have the same criteria - other than a constant of 
proportionality - this paper's formulation also escapes the consistency prob- 
lems for concurrent generations in Hori and Kanaya (1989, sect. VIII). [Note 
that Hori and Kanaya would classify (4)-(5) as a special case of 'paternalistic' 
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preferences.] In fact, at time t above, (4)-(5) imply both generations can be 
thought of as wanting to maximize 
oo 
E A(J-i)" [ g2 j  "+" u I ' j + I ]  • ( 6 )  
j - i  
Thus, (6) is an ordinal representation of the preferences of each of the two 
generations over consumption figures yet to be determined. 
One alternative specification of preferences would have parents care about 
their children but not about their predecessors - see, for instance, Altig and 
Davis (1989). Given multi-period overlaps between parents and their adult 
children in the present paper, however, 'single-sided altruism' would poten- 
tially complicate the analysis significantly: in place of the joint maximization 
in (9) below, motivated by this paper's high degree of reciprocal altruism, a 
T-period Stackelberg game would emerge -wi th  parents the 'leaders' and 
their children the 'followers'. Children might behave strategically- fully 
consuming their earnings early in marriage, for example, in order to extract 
large transfers when the arrival of their own children raised their households' 
marginal utility of wealth. Even if parents could somehow 'precommit' their 
transfers, year-by-year liquidity constraints for all parties [see (7)-(8) below] 
would tend to make the game more difficult to work with than (9). A lower 
degree of 'two-sided altruism' than this paper's would tend to introduce 
complexities even with one-period overlaps. For example, parents might try 
to consume their earnings early in life in order to extract larger inter vivos 
transfers from their (reluctant) children later [see Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1988), Laitner (1988), and Bruce and Waldman (1990)]. 
To characterize behavior, continue to focus on the single line of descent 
above. The following treatment proceeds in three steps: first it determines 
households' consumption conditional on inter vivos transfers and bequests, 
second it determines transfers conditional on bequests, and third it deter- 
mines bequests themselves. 
Above, generation i is age T at date t. Suppose the latter household's 
assets at each age s are d ( s ) .  Let the household's transfers to its adult son be 
~ i =  {xi(S)}s~[T, 2"T] and the transfers it receives from the child ~+i+1= 
{zi+l(s)}s~to, rl. Then from ages T to 2. T, conditional on £,i, its bequest b i, 
and its assets at age T, say e r r  -A ~, generation i will want to solve 
/)/~ld(-"'i f2" T'e-~'(s-  T) u(  ci( s ) s ) ds ,  x , Z i + l , A i ,  b i) - max • , 
c'(s) 
(7) 




r. ai(s) + w" eV'(t+s-T).l(s) -- ci(s) - - x i ( s )  
+zi+~(s - 7"), s ~ [~,  2 .  ~] ,  
ai(s) > O, s ~ [T, 2. T], 
a i ( T ) = e r t . A  i and a i ( 2 . T ) = b  i. 
Given bankruptcy laws, this paper assumes financial markets enforce a i ( s )  >_ 
0. The criterion of (7) follows from (6). 
With corresponding notation, generation i + 1 in the same line contempo- 
raneously wants to solve, conditional on Ti, 2"/÷ 1, bi, and A ~ ÷ 1, 
Ui+l,t[xY°Ung"---}/, Z i+1 , b i, A i+1) -- max / r e - ~  ' • u ( c i + l ( s ) , s ) d s ,  (8 )  
c i+ l(s) ~o 
subject to 
d a i + l ( s )  
ds 
r .  a i + l ( s )  + w .  eW(t+S).l(s) - c i + l ( s )  
'~-x i (sd-  T )  - z i + l ( s ) ,  s ~  [0,  T ] ,  
ai+' (s )>O,  s ~  [0, T], 
ai+X(0)  = 0  and ai+X(T) + b i = e v ' ( t + T ) . A  i+l .  
To determine ~i and Z '+~, conditional on A i and A i+t, consider the joint 
maximization problem 
u i t ( z i ,  z i+l ) ~ max f T e - ~ S ' u ( c i + l ( s ) , s ) d s  
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subject to 
i t (s )  = r ' a ( s )  + w ' e  v'(t+s)' [ I (T  + s )  + l ( s ) ]  
- c i ( s + T ) - c i + t ( s ) ,  s ~ [0, T ] ,  
a ( s )  > 0, s ~ [O ,T] ,  
a(O) = e ~ '  "A i and a ( T )  = e r ' ( '+v)  "A i+l 
Call (9) the ' joint  problem for genera t ion  i'. It has a unique solution - see 
Mariger  (1987) for an algorithm. Inser t  the solution path  for ci(s) f rom (9) 
into the account ing equat ion for ai(s) in (7). Set x i (s )  = 0 and z i+l(s  - T )  = 0 
for the moment .  If  ai(s) > 0 is violated at s ~ [T, 2" T], raise z i+l(s  - T) just 
enough  to make  # ( s ) =  0. Then  insert ci+t(s)  f rom (9) into the account ing 
equat ion  for (8). Set z i+l(s)  as above and initially let x~(s + T)  = 0. When-  
ever ai+l(s)  > 0 is violated, raise xi(s  + T )  just enough  to relieve it. Given 
the constraints  in (9), the const ructed  xi(s  + T)  and z i+t(s)  must  lead to 
feasible ai(s) and ai+l(s)  paths for (7)-(8)  - with ai(2 . T ) =  b i in (7) deter-  
mining b i. 
The  consumpt ion  saving and inter vivos t ransfers just derived maximize 
U 2i + U 1'i+1 in (6) for  the family line. [The maximized value is vit(A i, Ai+ t).] 
The  ou tcome  specified in the preceding pa ragraph  would emerge if house- 
hold i and its adult  son pooled  their resources f rom t to t + T and 
coopera ted  fully. Or, with Z i and A i+l specified and the constraints  of  
(7)-(8), it would be the payoff-dominant  Nash equilibrium for a game f rom t 
to t + T be tween genera t ion  i - allowed to choose b ~ > O, ci(s), and # ( s )  
> 0 ,  and x i ( s ) > O  all s ~ [ T ,  2 . T ] - a n d  genera t ion  i + l - a l l o w e d  to 
choose  ci+t(s),  a i+a(s)>O,  and z i + t ( s ) > O  all s ~ [ 0 ,  T]. This paper  as- 
sumes that  given A ~ and A i+l, the ou tcome just described does prevail 
each i. 
For  the last stage of  the character izat ion of  behavior,  note  that  A ~ is given 
(from past decisions) at t ime t. 2 Let Vit(A i) be the best value for (6) which 
genera t ion  i at t ime t thinks it can obtain. Let  
F --= e 13''y'T. 
Given (1) and (6), 
Vi+l,t+T( A ,  A * )  = [ "  vit( A ,  A * ) .  
2Note that e yt  "A i in (9) consists of the sum of the accumulated life-cycle savings generation i 
carries at age T and the bequest of generation i - 1. (This paper assumes that bequests never 
'skip generations': if generation i - 1 in a family line leaves an estate or makes an inter vivos gift, 
generation i is the recipient.) 
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Accordingly, assume generation i believes 
V/+l , t+r(A ) = F "  V/t(A). 
Then with time consistency, assume generation i believes as well 
Vit(A i) = max {vit(Ai, A i+1) + A . iV.Vit(Ai+l)} .  (10) 
AI+I>0 
Finally, appendix 1 constructs upper and lower bounds, VU(A) and V L such 
that feasibility alone requires 
e # V t . v L < v i t ( z i ) < _ e ~ ~ " t . v U ( z  i) fora l l  A i > 0 .  (11) 
For any given w and r, the household sector portion of this paper's model 
then seeks to derive a time path of Ai's from (10)-(11) and of consumption 
and inter vivos transfers from (6)-(9) - as outlined after (9). 
3. Stationary equilibria 
This paper considers only stationary equilibria. There is no government 
debt. The economy is closed. The features defining a stationary equilibrium 
are: (i) r and w are independent of time; (ii) the aggregate 'effective' labor 
supply, E t at time t, grows at geometric rate y; and (iii) the aggregate wealth 
stock, K t at time t, grows at the same rate y. Construction guarantees item 
(ii): 
E t = E o . e  ~.t for all t. 
Without sacrificing generality normalize 
E 0 = 1. 
This section examines our framework's stationary equilibria. There are 
three cases. Defining r* from 
~r" ( r * -  6) = y, 
r* is the 'modified golden-rule interest r a t e -  see Blanchard and Fischer 
(1989). The three possibilities are: r > r*, r =r*,  and r < r * .  For future 
reference, let 
H ( r )  =- (e -~ ' r .  e r r ) ' ~ / e ~ ' r ,  
so that H(r)  < 1 iff r < r*, H(r*)  = 1, and H(r)  > 1 iff r > r*. 
74 J. Laitner, Equilibria with borrowing constraints and altruism 
If r exceeds r*, families will desire time paths of consumption which rise 
faster than the rate of technological progress (think, for example, of a 
conventional representative agent model with 3' = 0 and r > 6). Thus, a 
stationary equilibrium with r > r* is impossible. Formally: 
Proposition 1. No  stationary state exists with r > r*. 
Proof.  Consider any family line. Using the envelope theorem, the first-order 
condition for a bequest from generation i to generation i +  1 -  see 
(9)-(10) - yields 
h ( r )  . [ c i ( r ) ]  t~-' > h(O) . [ci+1(0)] ¢ - ' ,  
with equality in the event of a positive transfer. The first-order condition for 
lifetime optimization yields 
h(O) [ci(O)] ¢-1 e r ' r ' e - ~ r ' h ( T ) [ c / ( r ) ]  ~ 1  
with equality if lifetime constraints do not bind at any age. Combining the 
two expressions, and noting tha t /3  - 1 < O, 
ci(O) ~_~ [e r'T. e-6"T]-° ' .ci+l(o) .  
Hence, 
H ( r )  "ci(O) ~ci+I(0).e ~r .  
Then H ( r ) >  1 implies 
ci(O) < ci+'(O) • e - ~ v .  (12) 
Aggregate steady-state consumption divided by K t must equal the constant 
( r  "K,  + w "E, - I ( , ) / K  t = r + w "( E t / K t )  - 3". (13) 
A constant growth rate 3, for K t is thus inconsistent with (12). • 
A stationary equilibrium can exist with r = r*. Without technological 
change, this is the familiar case with the interest rate equaling the subjective 
discount rate. Somewhat surprisingly, in any such equilibria none of the 
inequality constraints in ( 9 ) - ( 1 0 )  bind - and this is true despite that fact 
that our model does not have a single representative agent: at any date, the 
economy contains households of all ages. 
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Proposition 2. Let A • F < 1. Let r = r*. There exists K* < ~ such that private 
wealth accumulation can sustain K t / ( t o  • E t )  = K, any K above K*. In any such 
state, the inequality constraints o f  (9 ) - (10 )  never bind. 
Proof. Assume A • F < 1. Let r = r* - so that H ( r )  = 1. First we show that 
inequality constraints do not bind. 
Consider a stationary equilibrium. For any given family line and generation 
i, first-order conditions yield (as in the preceding proof) 
h (0 ) "  [ci(0)] ~-1 > e (r-~)'s • h ( s ) •  [ci(s)]  ~-1 
>_ e ( r - a ) r  • h ( r ) "  [ci( T)]/3-1 
>_ e(r-a) 'T'h(O) • [ c i + l ( 0 ) ] / 3 - 1  fo r  all s ~ [0, T] .  
(14) 
If  lifetime liquidity constraints bind for generation i in its youth, the first 
three terms in (14) are not all equal; if the nonnegativity constraint A i > 0 
binds, the last two are unequal - see (9). 
Suppose all terms in (14) are equal - so that the dynasty in question is not 
liquidity-constrained as it passes through generations i -  1 and i. Then 
H ( r )  = 1 implies 
ci(O) = c i + l ( 0  ) • e - r  'r. (15) 
The dynasty will face the same problem one generation later, except e ~T will 
multiply earnings, consumption, and assets; hence, given homothetic prefer- 
ences, the dynasty will not be constrained as it passes from generation i to 
i + 1. Continuing, once (15) holds for a family line in one generation, it holds 
in all subsequent generations. 
The alternative to (15), given H ( r ) =  1, is 
ci(O) ( c i + l ( 0 )  " e - f T .  (16) 
But, (16) cannot hold in all family lines, or (16) in some and (15) in others, if 
we have a stationary equilibrium - see the last step of the proof  of Proposi- 
tion 1. 
Thus, in a stationary equilibrium (15) must hold for all families. We have 
noted that (15) can only emerge when no lifetime or intergenerational 
inequality constraints bind. 
The existence portion of the proof  appears  in appendix 2. • 
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Household-sector  behavior will also allow stationary equilibria if r < r*, 
although 'operat ive '  dynastic connections disappear completely: 
Proposition 3. Le t  A • F < 1. For r < r*, suppose that economy has rested in a 
stationary state f o r  many  periods. Then there is some s such that every fami ly  is 
liquidity-constrained at age s. 
Proof .  Suppose we have a stationary state with r < r*. Consider any family 
line, and any generation i, currently of age T. Let the time be t = T as well. 
There  are four cases: 
(1) Suppose the liquidity constraint in (9) binds at age s in the joint 
problem of generation i, and suppose the same held in generation i -  1. 
Then with homotheticity we have a solution for the family line: the asset 
profile repeats itself, multiplied by e r r ,  generation after generation - always 
dipping to zero at age s. (Notice that if generation i is constrained at age s, 
generation i - 1  is concurrently constrained at age s + T. As the pat tern 
repeats,  generation i is constrained at s + T.) 
(2) Suppose the constraint binds at age s in the joint problem of generation 
i but that assets in the line were positive T years before. Note that chosen 
asset profiles will always be continuous. 
Consider fig. 1. Path A B C D  is the family line's solution. Derive the line's 
optimal solution had assets been zero at age s in generation i - 1. Consider 
possible solutions in that event represented by the dotted lines from E. Since 
the upper  one crosses A B C D ,  two distinct solutions emanate  from B. This is 
impossible given our strictly concave preferences.  Thus, the dotted solution 
must resemble E F C  - in that it must meet  the abscissa at C. But then EFC,  
multiplied by e rT,  must give the solution after C. In other words, after C we 
must enter  case (1). So, if the stationary state has persisted more than one 
period, the family line must be in case (1). 
(3) Suppose the liquidity constraint in (9) does not bind during the joint 
problem of generation i - 1 but the constraint A i > 0 binds. Then set s = T 
and repeat  cases (1) and (2). 
a( . )  
from eq. (9) 
Joint problem Joint problem Joint problem 
generation i -1 generation i generation i + 1 
A d ~" 
/ 
T .~ i I 
s s + T 2T T i m e  
Fig. 1. Utility-maximizing family asset profiles. 
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(4) Suppose the liquidity constraint of (9) does not bind during the joint 
problem of generation i - 1 and that A s > 0. 
As in the preceding proofs, 
H ( r ) .  c i - l ( 0 )  = ci(O) • e -~ ' r .  
Since H(r )  < 1 here, 
c i - - I ( o )  ) ci(O) " e - r  "r. (17) 
If  this inequality persists, over time consumption in the family line will 
become miniscule relative to earnings. Hence,  asset accumulation must begin 
at some point. After  accumulations have become very large, utility maximiza- 
tion will demand more consumption. Thus case (4) cannot persist indefinitely. 
When we leave case (4), we have just seen we end in case (1) - w h i c h  is 
permanent .  
Hence,  in a persisting stationary state, all family lines must be in case (1). 
Suppose two lines have different s values. As in fig. 1, the asset profiles 
cannot cross without being the same. So, there must be at least one common 
liquidity-constrained age. Thus, in a persisting stationary state, there exists an 
s such that every family unit drops to zero assets at age s [and so, as in case 
(1), at age s + T as well]. • 
The following proposition provides an additional characterization if r < r*. 
Appendix 2 provides a proof. 
Proposition 4. Let A • F < 1. Fix some r < r*. Suppose that the economy has 
rested in a stationary state for many periods. Then there is a unique solution to 
(10)-(11).  The right-hand side of  (10) defines a unique function 49(') with 
A* = 49(A). There is a unique A FP > 0 such that A FP = 49(AFP). In a persisting 
stationary state, each A i in (10) equals A rP - for all i and all family lines. 
Thus, in this case there is one and only one stationary-state ratio Kt / [ to .  E t ] 
consistent with household-sector utility maximization. 
Fig. 2 summarizes Propositions 1-4. For each r and w, the S curve graphs 
time-invariant ratios Ktf[oo "Et] consistent with private-sector utility maxi- 
mization. 
With r > r*, saving across generations is so attractive that wealth accumu- 
lation is unlimited - in other words, there can be no stationary equilibrium 
with r > r*. 
For r = r * ,  a ' pe rmanen t  income'  result holds: family lines want to 
equalize consumption at each given age, normalized for technological 
progress, across generations; hence, normalized dynastic wealth remains 
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Fig. 2. The supply and demand for wealth. 
constant - each household consumes during its lifetime only its own labor 
earnings plus the interest in excess of rate y on its inherited wealth. Any 
aggregate amount of wealth sufficient to insure that lifetime liquidity con- 
straints never bind (within any family line) is sustainable in a stationary 
equilibrium - leading to the flat part of S. 
For r < r*, Proposition 3 shows that dynastic wealth accumulation disap- 
pears. Proposition 4 shows the S curve associates a single Kt / [w 'E  t] with 
each r. 
An aggregate production function and an assumption of competitive factor 
pricing can complete the model• For example, suppose that net national 
product of Qt and that 
Qt=O'[Kt]  ~ [Et] 1-~, • a ~ ( 0 , 1 ) .  
Then competitive factor markets yield 
(r t . K t ) / ( w  , 'E,)  = a / ( 1  - a ) .  
The latter gives the demand curve D (or D') in fig. 2. E and E'  are then the 
possible stationary equilibria. 
In closing this section, compare Propositions 1-4 with Altig and Davis 
(1989, prop. 2). As stated above, Altig and Davis in effect assume one-period 
overlaps between parents and adult children and employ single-sided altru- 
ism. Conversely, their analysis allows the degree of altruism to be a parame- 
ter. Despite the differences, their Proposition 2 equilibria all have interest 
rates bounded above by r * - a s  in Proposition 1 above; when liquidity 
constraints bind in Altig and Davis [Proposition 2(ii)-(iii)], the interest rate is 
below r* - as in this paper's Propositions 2-3; and they focus on the role 
and importance of inter vivos transfers - just as this paper does. In contrast, 
Altig and Davis highlight the way in which liquidity needs can augment 
transfer activity, while the next two sections below tend to stress the conflict- 
ing nature of the two. 
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T r i a l  
T a b l e  1 
S t a t i o n a r y  e q u i l i b r i a  w i t h  d o u b l e -  a n d  t r i p l e - f a m i l y  c o m p o s i t e s .  
W e a l t h - t o - G N P  r a t i o s  I A > 0 a 
i 
L i f e - c y c l e  I n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  
m o d e l  w i t h  l i f e - cyc l e  m o d e l  
L i f e - c y c l e  l i q u i d i t y  w i t h  l i q u i d i t y  
P a r a m e t e r s  m o d e l  c o n s t r a i n t s  c o n s t r a i n t s  
D o u b l e - f a m i l y  c o m p o s i t e s  ( m a x i m u m  a d u l t  l i fe  s p a n  = 52  y e a r s )  
1 /3 = - 1, r = 0 .00  - 2 . 8 4 2  0 .157  0 .025  n o  
2 /3 = - 1, r = 0 .03 - 1.551 0.271 0 .268  y e s  
3 /3 = - 1, r = 0 .06  - 0 . 5 1 0  0 .447  N A  b N A  b 
4 /3 = - 3, r = 0 .00  - 2 .842  0 .156  0 .025 n o  
5 /3 = - 3, r = 0 .03  - 2 .078  0 .202  0 .096  n o  
6 /3 = - 3, r = 0 .06  - 1 .470 0 .246  0 .257  y e s  
7 /3 = - 9, r = 0 .00  - 2 .842  0 .156  0 .025  n o  
8 fl  = - 9, r = 0 .03  - 2 .378  0 .163 0 .035  n o  
9 /3 = - 9 ,  r = 0 .06 - 1 .970 0 .168  0 .065  n o  
T r i p l e - f a m i l y  c o m p o s i t e s  ( m a x i m u m  a d u l t  l i fe  s p a n  = 60  y e a r s )  
10 /3 = - 1, r = 0 .00  - 3 .094  0 .306  0 .139  y e s  
11 /3 = - 1, r = 0 .03 - 1.435 0 .535 0 .281 y e s  
12 /3 = - 1, r = 0 .06  - 1 .006 0 .818  N A  b N A  b 
13 /3 = - 3 ,  r = 0 .00  - 3 . 0 9 4  0 .306  0 .139  y e s  
14 /3 = - 3 ,  r = 0 .03 - 2 . 1 7 2  0 .401 0 .194  y e s  
15 /3 = - 3, r = 0 .06  - 1.455 0 .492  0 .265  y e s  
16 /3 = - 9 ,  r = 0 .00  - 3 . 0 9 4  0 .306  0 .139  y e s  
17 /3 = - 9, r = 0 .03 - 2 .586  0 .326  0 .154  y e s  
18 /3 = - 9, r = 0 .06  - 2 .127  0 .340  0 .174  y e s  
aSee line 18. 
b C a s e s  w i t h  r > r * .  
The tables select parameter  values familiar from the existing life-cycle 
literature and consistent with U.S. growth during the comparatively halcyon 
postwar period ending in the early 1970s. 
For the rate of labor-augmenting technological change, table 1 sets 3' = 
0.0187 - see Denison (1979, table 8-4). Table 2 considers a lower rate as well. 
A high rate tends to give young families a more important share of total of 
resources, consumption, and saving. It also makes earnings profiles rise more 
steeply with age. On balance, a lower 3" pushes the supply curve of fig. 2 to 
the right in our examples. 
The exogenous function h(s) in (1) can capture life-cycle changes in family 
composition. Following Tobin (1967), if n(s) is the number of 'equivalent 
adults' in a household of age s, set 
h ( s )  = [ n ( s ) ]  1 - / 3  f o r a l l  s ~ [ 0 , 2 . T ] .  
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Table 2 
Alternative parameter choices (/3 = - 3 and r = 0.03, unless otherwise noted). 
Wealth-to-GNP ratios ~ A > 0 
Trial 
Life-cycle Intergenerational 
model with life-cycle model 
Parameter Life-cycle liquidity with liquidity 
changes model constraints constraints 
Double-family composites (maximum adult life span = 52 years) 
1 Mariger's N(. )a - 2.102 0.103 0.025 yes 
2 No mortality b - 2.168 0.460 0.183 no 
3 3' = 0.01 - 1.458 0.282 0.300 yes 
4 z = 0.22 c - 1.932 0.175 0.081 no 
5 6 = 0.01, r = 0.00 -3.050 0.134 0.019 no 
6 6 = 0.01, r = 0.03 -2.248 0.180 0.051 no 
7 6 = 0.01, r = 0.06 - 1.618 0.223 0.196 yes 
Triple-family composites (maximum adult life span = 60 years) 
8 Mariger's N(- )a - 2.392 0.130 0.222 yes 
9 No mortality b - 2.572 0.610 0.124 yes 
10 3' = 0.01 - 1.344 0.551 0.296 yes 
11 z = 0.22 c - 2.071 0.335 0.178 yes 
12 6 = 0.01, r = 0.00 - 3.388 0.266 0.124 yes 
13 6 = 0.01, r = 0.03 -2.407 0.358 0.172 yes 
14 6 = 0.01, r = 0.06 - 1.656 0.447 0.235 yes 
aFollowing Mariger (1986, ch. 7) we weight children and teens 0.3 and adults 65-year-old and 
over 0.5. 
bBoth adults in every family live exactly 2- T years. 
CSee our construction of l(s) in section 5. 
A s s u m e  e a c h  h o u s e h o l d  b e g i n s  w i t h  a 2 0 - y e a r - o l d  m a l e  a n d  f e m a l e .  A f t e r  a n  
i n t e r v a l  d e s c r i b e d  b e l o w  t h e y  h a v e  t w o  c h i l d r e n .  T h e  c h i l d r e n  l e a v e  h o m e  to  
f o r m  t h e i r  o w n  f a m i l i e s  w h e n  t h e y  r e a c h  a g e  20. F a m i l i e s  h a v e  a c c e s s  to ,  a n d  
fu l ly  u t i l i ze ,  a c t u a r i a l l y  f a i r  a n n u i t i e s  a n d  l i fe  i n s u r a n c e .  S t a n d a r d  t a b l e s  
p r o v i d e  m o r t a l i t y  r a t e s  ( fo r  m e n  a n d  w o m e n  s e p a r a t e l y . )  F o r  s i m p l i c i t y  t h i s  
p a p e r ' s  c a l c u l a t i o n s  o m i t  c h i l d  m o r t a l i t y .  T a b l e  1 u s e s  T o b i n ' s  n u m e r i c a l  
w e i g h t s :  n(s )  e q u a l s  t h e  su rv iva l  p r o b a b i l i t y  ( t o  f a m i l y  a g e  s )  o f  t h e  h o u s e -  
h o l d ' s  a d u l t  m a l e ,  p l u s  t h e  s a m e  fo r  t h e  s p o u s e ,  p l u s  0 .6  t i m e s  t h e  c u r r e n t  
n u m b e r  o f  m i n o r  c h i l d r e n ,  p l u s  0 .8  t i m e s  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  t e e n a g e r s .  T a b l e  2 
e x p e r i m e n t s  w i t h  e s t i m a t e d  w e i g h t s  f r o m  M a r i g e r  (1986)  a n d  w i t h  o m i t t i n g  
a d u l t  m o r t a l i t y .  
F ig .  3 g r a p h s  t h e  e q u i v a l e n t  a d u l t s  p r o f i l e s  w h i c h  t a b l e s  1 a n d  3 - 4  use .  A s  
o u t l i n e d  in  s e c t i o n  2, t a b l e  1 a s s u m e s  h o u s e h o l d s  h a v e  t h e i r  c h i l d r e n  a f t e r  
f ive y e a r s .  T h e  d i a g r a m  i n c l u d e s  i n d i v i d u a l  f a m i l y  p ro f i l e s ,  n(s),  f o r  2 .  T = 52  
a n d  60; t h e  n(s )  + n(s  + T )  p r o f i l e  f o r  a ' u n i t ' ,  as  in  (9),  c o m p o s e d  o f  a y o u n g  
a n d  o l d  fami ly ,  w i t h  T = 26;  a n d  t h e  p r o f i l e  fo r  a t r i p l e  u n i t .  T h e  l a s t  a l l o w s  
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4. Equilibria with r < r* 
This section considers the implications of Propositions 2 - 4  - especially the 
latter two - in more detail. 
For stationary equilibria with r = r*, Proposition 2 shows that, as in 
conventional representative agent models, Ricardian debt neutrality arises: 
the timing of tax collections will not affect consumption and wealth accumu- 
lation. In fact, 'life-cycle' elements have virtually no role in determining the 
economy's stationary capital intensity. For, consider a change in the shape of 
the h ( ' )  or l ( . )  profile. Stationary-equilibrium aggregate wealth can continue 
at its old level provided we choose each family line's A ° properly - see the 
proof  of Proposition 2 in the appendix. In terms of fig. 2, the S curve merely 
slides right or left on top of itself; assuming the demand curve remains fixed, 
the equilibrium interest rate and K/(~o .  E )  ratio remain unchanged. Simi- 
larly, a change in the aggregate production function will tend to leave the 
stationary equilibrium at r*. 
Cases with r < r* are more novel. Proposition 3 shows that liquidity 
constraints then bind at regular intervals within every family line. Consider 
any such instance and line. Proposition 3 shows (9)-(10) yield an s such that 
an overall solution corresponds to: maximizing behavior between ages s and 
s + T in framework (9), beginning and ending with binding liquidity con- 
straints; maximizing behavior over the next T years, beginning and ending 
with binding constraints; etc. Thus in any such equilibrium 'operat ive '  con- 
nections in every family line shrink to no more than T y e a r s -  leaving a 
sequence of short-time-horizon maximization problems. The latter problems 
are each reminiscent of an overlapping generations model with no altruism. 
As in the overlapping generations model, Propositions' 3 - 4  stationary 
equilibria do not exhibit Ricardian debt neutrality. To see this, suppose the 
government decides to levy a lump sum tax today, using the proceeds to 
retire national debt - and promising to make lump sum transfers back to the 
private sector more than T years in the future, financed with debt, and 
equaling, in present  value terms, the current increment to tax revenues. With 
r < r*, every family line faces binding liquidity constraints within at most T 
years; so, given existing factor prices, complete private offsets will not occur. 
Rather,  the old stationary state will be disrupted. 3 
More generally, comparative static changes in lifetime profiles of earnings 
or family composition will influence wealth accumulation in Proposition 3's 
short-horizon problems, just as in the overlapping generations model. Thus, 
we can expect horizontal shifts in fig. 2 - leading (see Proposition 4) to new 
sets of stationary equilibria. Hence,  r < r* provides a model in which 
3Equivalence properties can still hold for fiscal policies which redistribute resources between 
living generations - see, for example, Altig and Davis (1989). 
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'life-cycle' attributes matter to the economy's capital intensity. (Likewise, 
changes in the aggregate production function will influence r.) 
This is not to say that conventional overlapping generations formulations 
correctly describe behavior for equilibria with r < r*. Using Proposition 3, we 
can think about family utility maximization in two ways: (a) for the age s 
determined in Proposition 3, a line can solve its overall problem by maximiz- 
ing utility from generation i + l 's  age s to s + T, beginning and ending the 
interval with 0 assets, and then repeat the process for another interval of T 
years, etc.; 4 or (b) the line can can solve (10) for A i, i = 1, 2 . . . . .  and then 
deduce year-by-year behavior using (9). 
This paper employs approach (b). Think of first solving (10) for A i, 
i = 1, 2 . . . .  Proposition 4 shows, in fact, that 
A i = A  for all i, (18) 
for some (unique) A. Second, analyze the life cycle of joint 'unit '  i in (9), 
with the A i and A i÷~ from (18). [Proposition 3 guarantees that either A = 0 
or the lifetime liquidity constraint in (9) will bind at one or more ages 
s ~ (0, T)  for the unit'.] Differences from conventional life-cycle analyses are: 
joint 'units'  live T years (as opposed to natural families which live 2.  T 
years); 'units' have family composition and earnings profiles which combine 
elements from a young and an old family; lifetime liquidity constraints apply 
to 'units' rather than single households; and 'units' may begin and end life 
with positive assets holdings - w i t h  (10) determining the magnitude of the 
latter. 
5. Total wealth accumulation 
This section presents several numerical examples. All apply to the S curve 
in fig. 2" for a selection of given values of r, the tables present stationary 
K o / [ w . E  o] ratios consistent with household utility maximization. All exam- 
ples assume r < r * - t h e  case of Propositions 3-4. Primary findings are: 
(i) private stationary-equilibrium wealth accumulation tends to be very low 
in relation to the U.S. economy's actual performance; (ii) despite the total 
absence, established above, of enduring dynastic wealth holdings, quite large 
transfers between households appear - mainly in the form of inter vivos gifts; 
(iii) the transfers tend to contribute to low overall wealth accumulation by 
facilitating high consumption levels for young families; and (iv) binding 
lifetime liquidity constraints arise fairly frequently despite altruistic transfer 
flows - but their effects on utility tend to be much smaller than in traditional 
formulations. 
4Notice that the family line would have needed to use (9)-(10) in concert to deduce s. 
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Fig. 3. Number of equivalent adults per family unit. 
three generations to overlap - in our examples, a family of age s e [0, 20], a 
parent family of age s + 20, and a family of the parents'  parents of age 
s + 40. The maximum age for a family is 60 in this last case (and for a person, 
80), and families have their children immediately (instead of after six years) 
so that children are ready to form their own households when their parents 
are 40. 
A household's earnings profile has two components: 
l ( s ) = ( 1 - r ) ' l * ( s ) + l * * ( s ) ,  s ~  [ 0 , 2 " T ] .  (19) 
The first part reflects lifetime earnings and a tax rate z. As in Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987), table 1 sets ~- = 0.15. Table 2 tries ~" = 0.22 - roughly the 
U.S. ratio of tax collections to GNP in 1972. The profile l*(s) comes from 
median earnings by age figures for 1972 published in the Social Security 
Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement. The calculations separately multiply 
male and female earnings by participation rates from Employment and 
Earnings (1972), then by survival probabilities, and then sum them. 
The second component of (19) captures social security benefits. It includes 
average male social security retirement benefits for 1972 (from the Social 
Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement) multiplied by survival proba- 
bilities, and the same for females (including retired women, wives of retired 
workers, and widows). 
Figs. 4 -7  present earnings profiles. 
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Fig. 4. Earnings, consumption, and assets for single-family unit, 52-year life. 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987, pp. 50-51)  suggest choices/3 = - 1, - 3, - 9. 
Table 2 tries 6 = 0 and 0.01. Tables 1 and 3 - 4  consider r = 0, 0.03, 0.06 
(notice that these correspond to after-tax real interest rates). 
The simulations use discrete t ime (with yearly periods) and normalize the 
wage to 1. 5 For each given r, they solve (10) using Bellman's (1957) 'succes- 
sive approximations' .  6 The right-hand side of (10) yields an optimizing rule 
A* = ~b(A). 
Proposition 4 shows 4)(.) has a single fixed point. 
Using the fixed-point value for A, solve (9) with the algorithm from 
Mariger  (1987). The resulting profile of lifetime asset holdings, a ( s ) ,  s = 
1 . . . . .  T, yields a stationary wealth-to-wage bill ratio for the economy: in the 
5Given isoelastic utility, to change the stationary-state wage from 1 to w, merely multiply all 
consumption and asset profiles by w and all utility figures by w/3; given the choice of abscissa in 
fig. 2, the S curve is unaffected. 
6In practice, the calculations used the envelope theorem and did successive approximations on 
the derivative of the value function. They used a grid of values for A consisting of about 300 
intervals. If the present value of a time-0 family's earnings are y, Proposition 3 shows that the 
grid need only span [0, y • e r ' T ] .  
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40 
case of two-generation joint 'units', 
T T 
K / ( w ' E )  = K / E  = ~ a(i)" e - ( i - n V w "  E l*(i).  
i=1  i=1  
Since the 1972 ratio of the wage bill to GNP was about 0.6645, the tables 
present 
K / G N P  = 0.6645 . K / (  w . E) .  
The third columns of table 1-2  include wealth-to-GNP ratios for a conven- 
tional life-cycle model (the maximum personal life span being either 72 or 80 
years, depending on the trial). The fourth columns incorporate a lifetime 
liquidity constraint, and the fifth columns switch to the model of this paper. 
For comparison, adding Musgrave's (1986) 1972 figure for U.S. net repro- 
ducible private capital (4655 bil. 1982-$), his corresponding measure of the 
stock of consumer durables (740.0 bil. 1982-$), the 1972 national accounts 
measure of inventory stocks (612.4 bil. 1982-$), and Seater's (1981) 1972 
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market value of government debt (235.0 bil. 1982-$) yields an empirical ratio 
of private wealth to GNP of 2.39. 
Clearly the simulation numbers are very small in every trial. For columns 
3-4  this tends to reinforce findings from other studies - see, for example, 
Mariger (1986, ch. 11 and app. E). 
Comparing columns 3 and 4 of tables 1-2, lifetime liquidity constraints 
increase private wealth accumulation enormously. The sign changes between 
columns are consistent with Mariger (1986, app. E). 7 
As we add intergenerational altruism in column 5, we might expect that 
inter vivos gifts from parents to their otherwise liquidity-strapped grown 
children would allow the latter to spend more early in life. In turn, we might 
suspect that aggregate wealth would decline - moving us back toward col- 
umn-3 outcomes. This intuition is borne out in most of the trials of tables 
1-2. 8 
Figs. 4 -7  present consumption profiles for families in traditional (but 
liquidity-constrained) life-cycle families, as well as two- and three-generation 
joint 'units' - as in (9). The parameter  values are /3 = - 3 ,  r = 0.03, 8 = 0, 
and y = 0.0187. For separate families, liquidity constraints bind for almost 
the first half of adult life - after which consumption (per equivalent adult) 
jumps to a significantly higher level; for our composite units, consumption 
(per equivalent adult) profiles are almost fiat. 
Tables 3 -4  show that binding lifetime liquidity constraints are fairly 
common for our composite units. [Recall that a composite 'unit '  in table 3 
(table 4) lives only half (one third) as long as a conventional family; hence, 
one constrained year for the former corresponds to two (three) for the latter.] 
This is somewhat surprising - the general shape of earnings' profiles suggests 
that cooperation between a young and old household might lift liquidity 
burdens otherwise likely to plague the former. Percentages of constrained 
years are not inconsistent with Campbell and Mankiw (1990), however, nor, 
when r > 0, with many other papers. Furthermore,  Cox and Jappelli (1990) 
suggest that although in practice liquidity needs and inter vivos transfer 
7In comparing simulations from different sources, treatments of children, technological 
change, and social security often vary. Perhaps more importantly, studies sometimes derive 
wealth holdings at different given interest rates, as above, and sometimes add an aggregate 
production function and solve for r endogenously. The life-cycle model's problems in generating 
large amounts of wealth - recall the introduction - tend to manifest themselves in the latter 
cases in the form of low steady-state wealth-to-GNP results, high interest rates, steep lifetime 
consumption profiles, and, in the absence of liquidity constraints, short periods with negative 
wealth [see, for instance, Tobin (1967), Mariger (1966, ch. 11), and Hubbard and Judd (1986, 
table 3)]. The latter will tend to lead to smaller effects from adding liquidity constraints than in 
tables 1-2. 
SThe intuition is imperfect because an intent to make an inter vivos transfer later may lead a 
household to save more early in life. 
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T a b l e  3 
D o u b l e - f a m i l y  c o m p o s i t e s :  C o m p e n s a t i n g  v a r i a t i o n s  f o r  r e m o v i n g  l i f e t i m e  l i q u i d i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s  
a n d  t h e  m a g n i t u d e  o f  l i f e t i m e  t r a n s f e r s  ( m a x i m u m  a d u l t  l i fe  s p a n  = 52  y e a r s ) .  
T r i a l  P a r a m e t e r s  
I n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  l i f e -cyc le  m o d e l  w i t h  
l i q u i d i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s  
L i f e - c y c l e  m o d e l  w i t h  
l i q u i d i t y  c o n s t r a i n t s  L i f e t i m e  
t r a n s f e r - t o - G N P  
Y e a r s  Y e a r s  r a t i o  
b i n d i n g  C o m p e n -  b i n d i n g  C o m p e n -  
l i q u i d i t y  s a t i n g  l i q u i d i t y  s a t i n g  T r a n s f e r s  T r a n s f e r s  
c o n -  v a r i a t i o n  c o n -  v a r i a t i o n  to  y o u n g  to  o ld  
s t r a i n t s  r a t i o  a s t r a i n t s  r a t i o  a f a m i l i e s  f a m i l i e s  
1 /3 = - 1, 21 - 0 .203  10 - 0 .005 0 .058  0 .002  
r = 0 .00  
2 /3 = - 1, 11 - 0 .105 2 - 0.001 0 .063  0 .000  
r = 0 .03 
3 /3 = - 1, 5 - 0 .048  N A  b N A  ~ N A  b N A  b 
r = 0 .06  
4 /3 = - 3 ,  21 - 0 . 4 1 0  10 - 0 . 0 1 2  0 .058  0 .002  
r = 0 .00  
5 /3 = - 3, 19 - 0 .330  4 - 0 .005 0 .059  0 .000  
r = 0 .03 
6 /3 = - 3, 12 - 0 .265 2 - 0 .002  0 .069  0 .000  
r = 0 .06  
7 /3 = - 9, 21 - 0 .684  10 - 0 .042  0 .058  0 .002  
r = 0 .00  
8 /3 = - 9, 21 - 0 .638  9 - 0 .033  0 .059  0.001 
r = 0 .03 
9 /3 = - 9, 20  - 0 .595 5 - 0 .028  0 .060  0 .003 
r = 0 .06  
a C o m p e n s a t i n g  v a r i a t i o n  d i v i d e d  by  p r e s e n t  v a l u e  o f  l i f e t i m e  r e s o u r c e s .  
b C a s e s  w i t h  r > r * .  
activity tend to be positively correlated, many binding constraints remain in 
spite of transfers. 
Even if liquidity constraints bind in many periods, they need not have 
much of an effect on lifetime utility. Tables 3 - 4  present information on this 
in the form of compensating variations: for a family or composite unit subject 
to liquidity constraints, the table recomputes lifetime utility in the absence of 
lifetime nonnegativity restrictions (but preserving starting and ending asset 
figures), determining the reduction in resources in the latter case which yields 
lifetime utility equal to that for the constrained model. The tables list the 
reduction as a percentage of original lifetime resources. The figures show 
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Ta b l e  4 
Tr ip le  family  composi tes :  C o m p e n s a t i n g  var ia t ions  for r e m o v i n g  l i fe t ime liquidity const ra ints  
( m a x i m u m  adul t  life span = 60 years) .  
Tr ia l  P a r a m e t e r s  
Life-cycle mode l  with 
liquidity cons t ra in ts  
l n t e r g e n e r a t i o n a l  
life-cycle mo d e l  with 
liquidity const ra ints  
Ye a r s  C o m p e n -  Yea r s  C o m p e n -  
binding sat ing binding sat ing 
liquidity var ia t ion  liquidity var ia t ion  
const ra ints  ra t io  a const ra ints  ra t io  a 
1 /3 = - 1, r = 0.00 24 - 0.195 7 - 0.081 
2 /3 = - 1, • = 0.03 15 - 0.095 3 - 0.060 
3 /3 = - 1, • = 0.06 6 - 0 . 0 4 1  N A  b N A  b 
4 /3 = - 3 ,  • = 0.00 24 - 0 . 4 1 2  7 - 0 . 1 0 6  
5 /3 = - 3 ,  • = 0.03 20 - 0 . 3 3 1  5 - 0 . 0 6 9  
6 /3 = - 3, • = 0.06 15 - 0.265 2 - 0.042 
7 /3 = - 9 ,  • = 0.00 24 - 0 . 6 9 3  7 - 0 . 1 6 4  
8 /3 = - 9, • = 0.03 23 - 0.647 5 - 0.124 
9 /3 = - 9, r = 0.06 21 - 0.602 5 - 0.085 
a C o m p e n s a t i n g  var ia t ion  divided by p resen t  va lue  of  l i fet ime resources .  
that welfare losses tend to be much greater in the traditional life-cycle 
framework - though this is more true for table 3 than for table 4. 
Our compensating-variation results are reminiscent of outcomes in 
Kotlikoff and Spivak (1981). Kotlikoff and Spivak show that when no market 
for annuities functions (possibly because of adverse selection), individuals 
with independent probabilities of death can greatly mitigate their utility 
losses by banding together into family-sized groups in which members pool 
resources. Our analysis presupposes that altruism leads naturally to multi- 
family 'units' - section 2's maximization of (9). Tables 3-4 show that non- 
market behavior within the 'units' can drastically reduce the disutility which 
the absence of a market for consumption loans causes in the life-cycle 
formulations without altruism of column 4. 
Finally, table 3 presents simulations of the total magnitude of intergenera- 
tional transfers. Results are presented as ratios to GNP. (Thus, in trial 1, 
aggregate transfers from old to young families within two-family composite 
'units' are about 5.8% of GNP in a stationary equilibrium with household 
parameter /3 = -  1 and interest rate r = 0.00.) The table only considers 
two-family joint units. The numbers emerge as follows (recall section 2). 
Assign initial assets (if any) exclusively to the older family in the composite of 
(9) (recall that beginning asset correspond to life-cycle saving carried over 
from age T by the older family, plus any bequest from the older family's 
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parents). The analysis determines a time path of consumption per equivalent 
adult for each unit. That  and profiles of equivalent adults yield life-cycle 
consumption paths for young and old families. Earnings data and starting 
assets then imply separate asset profiles for both family types, though 
liquidity constraints may fail. However, starting with the composite's first age, 
for any year in which the young family's assets would drop below zero, assign, 
and record, a permanent  transfer from the old family sufficient to make the 
young family's assets zero. The transfer, of course, reduces the only family's 
wealth. Similarly for transfers in the other direction. Any assets which the old 
family holds at the end of its life constitute a further intergenerational 
transfer - corresponding in practice to a bequest. 
In every trial transfers from young families to old families were tiny. 
However, transfers from the old to the young always came out near 6% to 
GNP. The latter ratio is large in relation to the empirical estimate of about 
2.5% in Kurz (1984), Cox (1987), and Cox and Raines (1985). [Recent work 
by Gale and Scholz (1991) with additional data tends to confirm the figure.] 
Fig. 5 shows the life-cycle pattern of transfers in one instance: they start out 
very high and tail off. There  are three humps. Presumably the earliest stems 
in part from indirect costs of college - implicit in our earnings profiles. The 
second appears as the young family has children. The third, which is consid- 
erably smaller, appears as the latter mature into teenagers - recall Tobin's 
(1967) equivalent adults scales. 
In the case graphed in fig. 5, the ratio of discounted earnings for an old to 
a young family is 0.66, but the ratio of discounted adult equivalencies is 0.41. 
For interest rates of 0 and 0.06, the ratios are 0.55 versus 0.38 and 0.79 versus 
0.45, respectively. With Mariger's weights (see table 2) they are 0.66 versus 
0.49 (and the equilibrium ratio of interfamily transfers to GNP - see the last 
two columns of table 3 - is 0.053); dropping mortality (as in table 2) they are 
0.98 versus 0.67 (and the ratio of transfers to GNP is 0.050). One way to 
reduce the magnitude of intergenerational transfers in our model would be to 
adopt equivalency scales and earnings profiles yielding more nearly equal 
proportions. Another  possibility would be to modify the high degree of 
altruism which the model assumes. 
6. Conclusion 
This paper shows that combined within the same model, liquidity con- 
straints and altruism - each in its own right a potentially attractive addition 
to the analysis of saving - tend to conflict. Specifically, for a framework with 
homogeneous agents, Propositions 2-3  show that in a stationary equilibrium 
either (i) liquidity constraints bind regularly and dynastic accumulation never 
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extends beyond a half of a single life span, or (ii) liquidity constraints never 
bind. 
In the first instance, which has received less attention in the existing 
literature than the second, Ricardian debt neutrality is absent and life-cycle 
attributes are important. Examining it in more detail, section 4 finds both 
similarities to and differences from traditional models without altruism. 
Section 5's simulation examples investigate the same case quantitatively. 
Results show that altruism tends to lead to substantial inter vivos transfers 
from parent families to their grown children. The gifts function as a private 
mechanism which reduces the importance, in terms of utility, of binding 
lifetime liquidity constraints (though many instances of binding constraints 
remain). 
The same intergenerational transfers tend to subvert the positive influence 
of life-time liquidity constraints on life-cycle wealth accumulation. Existing 
work showing the insufficiency of the latter in explaining total national saving 
is therefore reinforced. 
As a topic for future research, the analysis in this paper seems to indicate 
that we need to allow more heterogeneity among households than just 
different birth dates if we are both to explain realistic amounts of wealth 
accumulation and to have stationary equilibria with binding liquidity con- 
straints. Quantitative results also seem to hint that either existing measure- 
ments of inter vivos transfers tend to be too low or the degree of altruism 
assumed in this paper may be somewhat too high. 
A p p e n d i x  1: V L and  v U (  • ) 
Let yU( t )  be the present value at time t of the remaining labor earnings of 
a household currently aged T plus the labor earnings of its son's household 
for the latter's first half of life. Then 
y V ( t  ) = er- t .  yU(0  ) = e r . , .  yC .  
Consider generation i which is aged T at time t. Setting A j = 0, for all 
j > i, is certainly feasible; hence, 
o~ 
Vit( A )  >- et~'r't" v L  = e ~ r t "  E [ A . T] (J - i ) . v i t (O,O) .  
j=i  
[Note that the assumed properties of 1(.) imply vit(0 , 0) > - ~ . ]  
J .E .D.C.  D 
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Given A i, even with no lifetime consumption, A j is bounded 
follows: for all j > i, 




j - i  
E e r . r ]  k . e r . t t + ( j - i ~  r - k . v l ,  yO 
k = O  
j - i  
AJ NAU(Ai ,  j ) = - [ e r ' T / e v r ]  ( j - i ) 'A i+  E [ e r T / e " r ]  k ' Y U .  
k = O  
Vit(A ) < e t~z't. VU(A)  - e ~'~'t .  ~ [A .F] ( j - i ) . v ( A U ( A , j ) , O ) .  
j=i 
Appendix 2 
Existence proof for Proposition 2 
Consider any family line. Let the current time be t = 0. Suppose genera- 
tion i in the line is now aged T. Let  A • F < 1. Until Step 2 let r < r*. 
Step 1. Suppose/3 < 0. Then Vio(-) < 0. Using (11), define 
v * ( A ,  A*) = max{rio(A, A*) ,  V L - 1}. 
Then v*( . )  is bounded. (11) shows that if we substitute v*( . )  for vi0(.) in 
(10), Vi0(. ) will not be affected - maximizing behavior will never reach values 
of v* ( ' )  different from vi0('). 
Suppose 1 >/3 > 0. 
r < r *  = ~ + (1 - / 3 ) . y c * r - y < 6 - f l ' y .  (A.1) 
A . F  < 1 implies 6 - / 3 - y  > 0, so the right-hand side of (A.1) is positive. 
Hence, 
/3 . ( r - ~ ) < 6 - /3 " "),. 
Thus, appendix 1 shows VU(A) in (11) is finite each A. We have rio( ')  > O. 
Set 
v*( A , A * )  =min{vio( A , A * ) , V U (  A )  + 1}. 
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Set ,o~'--[O,A-] for any / f<oo .  Then v * ( A , A * )  is bounded all A ~z¢'. 
Replacing rio(.) in (10)with v*(.), V,.0(.)will not be affected - as above. 
The boundedness of v * ( A ,  A*),  all A ~ ~¢', enables us to use Theorems 
4.3, 4.6, and 4.8 of Stokey and Lucas (1989). These establish that (10)-(11) 
have a unique solution for all A ~ ,~e', V/0 (.)  is concave, and the right-hand 
side of (10) defines a unique policy function [~b(.) in Proposition 4], These 
results hold for every bounded z¢'. 
Step 2. Now let r = r*. Let A ° be given. 
r = r * = 6  + ( 1 - f l )  . y ' ~ r - y = t ~ - f l . 7  > O 
makes the present value, say, Y, of the our family line's labor earnings now 
and in all future periods finite. The proof in the text shows equalities must 
prevail in (13) for a stationary equilibrium. With equality, the line's optimal 
consumption pattern obeys [recall that r = r* implies tr- (r - 6) = 3'] 
ci+l(s) Jr ci(s "~ T) =C" [ ( h s / h o ) ~ +  ( ( h s + r ) / h o )  ~] "e ~'(~-a)S 
=-- ¢ • A s • e~r'(r-6)'s 
=c- /~s - e  v's foral l  s ~ [ 0 ,  T], 
where 
C-~ [Y-bZ°]//[i~=oe(Y-r)'i 'T.foTfls.e(Y-r)Sds] 
=--[Y+A°]/[i=~ 0 e (v-r)i 'T. It] 
The family line will certainly avoid binding liquidity constraints over the 
next T years [see (9)] if 
f0 t A ° > c  • /Tts-etV-°Sds forall  
Since the integrand is nonnegative, 
0 < t _< T. (A.2) 
c .  h = c .  foThs • e (v-r)'s ds  
> C " foths . e(V-r)'S ds  foral l  O < t < T. (A.3) 
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So, (A.2) will hold if 
A ° > c" h = ( Y + A ° ) / d .  (A.4) 
Since d > 1, (A.4) will hold for large enough A °. Let ~ be the present value 
of our line's labor earnings over the next T years. Then Y = d"3~ and 
er'T [ ] e r r  [ A° += Y] . 
e ~ r  d 
erT[ 
- - "  A °" = A  °. (A.5) 
e v T  d" 
So, constraints will then not bind in the future. This and Step 1 show that an 
unconstrained stationary equilibrium exists. 
Step 3. Let ~ -= (l s + / , + r ) "  w. Our family line above will avoid constraints 
over the next T years if and only if 
£- f0'h AO + Ys " e ( r - r ) ' s  d s  >_ c • s" e ( r - r ) ' s  d s  fo r  all  0 < t < T 
But, 
~(A°)  - A ° +  ~ s . e ( ~ - r ) " d s  _ = = • ~ s . e ( ~ - r ) , d s > O .  
d ' h  
X(A °) > 1 - ( l / d )  > O. 
So, if A ° = A  allows an unconstrained steady state, any A ° > A  will too. (A.5) 
shows that if A ° avoids binding constraints from 0 to T, the same will hold in 
the future. Since e r t  • A(A °) also gives the family line's asset holdings t years 
from now, t ~ [0, T], Proposition 2 is established. • 
Proof  o f  Proposition 4 
Consider any family line. Let the current time be t = 0. Suppose genera- 
tion i in the line is now aged T. Let r < r* and A • F < 1. 
Step 1. Step 1 above shows (10)-(11) have a unique solution, V,0(.) is 
concave, and th(') is uniquely determined. 
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Step Z Clearly rio(A, A * )  is increasing in A and decreasing in A*. The  
concavity of  V/0(.) and the r ight-hand side of  (10) then show that  $ ( . )  is 
nondecreasing.  
Let  y be the present  value at t = 0 o f  the lifetime earnings of  the joint unit 
in (9). Let  y * =  e r T . y / e W r .  If  lifetime liquidity constraints bind in (9), 
account ing shows oh (A)<  y*. If  not, ~b(A)= 0 or  Stokey and Lucas (1989, 
theorem 4.11) and (17) require ~ b ( A ) < A .  A simple graph  then shows ~b(.) 
must  have a fixed point  AFar> 0 with A F P =  (~)(AFP). The  arguments  show 
that  if A t = A  FP, lifetime constraints must  bind during the prior  T years. In 
that  case, however, ~b(A °) = A  FP must  be independent  of  A °. Hence,  A FP is 
unique. 
Step 3. Consider  a family line with A ° =  A. If  lifetime liquidity constraints 
bind before  A t, the a rgument  above shows 2Zl 1 = A  FP. Then  A i = A  Fv for all 
i > 1. If  constraints do not bind before /4 ~, the arguments  show A 1 < A  °. 
Similarly, A 2 = A  Fv or  A 2 , ( A  1. Continuing,  asset accumulat ions at every age 
fall as generat ions  pass. Thus,  a stat ionary state for the economy is only 
possible when A i = A  FP, all i, every family line. The  last part  of  Proposi t ion 4 
then follows f rom the uniqueness of  solutions to (9). • 
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